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Parallel Proceedings - Converging Views:
The Westec Appeal
JANET WALKER

INTRODUCTION

n the jungles of transnational litigation,' there is probably nothing quite as savage as parallel litigation. It is savage because the
commencement of a second proceeding on the same matter in a different forum almost inevitably represents some form of abuse. It is
either an abusive tactic to avoid an orderly determination by the
first forum of whether it is an appropriate forum or it is an act of
despair at the opportunistic choice by the opposing party of a court
that is either unwilling or incapable of making a principled determination of whether it is an appropriate forum. Parallel litigation
is savage also because it can seem to pit courts against one another
by requiring them to make determinations that threaten to impinge
on each court's most basic entitlement - its inherent jurisdiction
to control its own process and to determine its own jurisdiction.
It might be thought that the situation would be less egregiously
bad when parallel proceedings are commenced in two courts
Janet Walker is an Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. This article was
developed from a paper entitled "Parallel Proceedings: A Bird's-Eye View of the
Jungle," which was written for the panel presentation entitled "International
Comity and the Westec Case," given in Ottawa on May 3, 2001 at the Canadian Bar
Association's International Section Conference entitled The Practiceof International
Law in the Twenty-First Century:It's Everybody's Business [hereinafter CBAO Conference Proceedings]. The author is grateful to Professors Vaughan Black and John
Claydon for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.
In AirbuslndustneGlEv. Patel, [1998] 2 W.L.R. 686, [1988] 2 All E.R. 257 (HL),
at para. 12 [hereinafter Airbus], Lord Goff described the common law world as "a
jungle of separate, broadly based, jurisdictions" in which "potential excesses ...
are generally curtailed by the adoption of the principle of forum non convenlens
[which] cannot, and does not aim to, avoid all clashes ofjurisdiction."
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that take similar, even-handed approaches to the determination of
appropriate forum. Under such circumstances, the effects of the
abuse would be less obvious because the matter would not be left to
be determined in an inappropriateforum. However, the problem
would remain a serious one because, in fact, it might be more difficult to resolve. If one forum was clearly inappropriate, a stay or an
injunction might be available to resolve the multiplicity on the traditional grounds of forum non conveniens alone. However, where
neither forum was clearly inappropriate and the multiplicity could
not be resolved in that way, the parallel litigation will foster a race
to judgment and the potential for one court to have its proceeding
abruptly terminated by the tender of a judgment from the other
court. The defendant in each forum would have a strong incentive
to frustrate the resolution of the matter in that forum and little
incentive to participate in good faith.
Abuse is almost inevitably present in situations of parallel proceedings, but the vexing question can be 'which is the abusive
party?" 2 Is it the party that has made the pre-emptive strike by being
the first to commence an action or is it the party that has not sought
to resolve the forum dispute in the first forum? Neither the way
in which an action is framed, such as in the case of declaratory
relief, nor the sequence in which the proceedings are commenced
is determinative. It could be entirely appropriate to respond to the
threat of litigation in an inappropriate forum by commencing
an action in an appropriate forum for a declaration that the
applicant is not liable. A pre-emptive strike could be warranted to
prevent an imminent abuse. Similarly, where a principled determination of appropriate forum is not available in an inappropriate forum (or even where the defendant is simply incapable of
travelling to the plaintiff's chosen forum for a determination of
appropriate forum), it is hardly abusive to respond by commencing
a proceeding in an appropriate forum instead of making the hopeless or heroic effort to seek a stay in the first forum. While it may
2 It should be clarified at the outset that the situations of "parallel proceedings"

considered in this article are not those in which a plaintiff commences claims
against a defendant in the same matter in more than one forum or those in which
more than one claimant seeks the same relief in a matter from one or more defendants (on which, see, for example, E Sherman "Antisuit Injunction and Notice
of Intervention and Preclusion: Compementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative
Litigation" (1995) Brigham Ybung U. L. Rev. 925). Furthermore, the question
of what constitutes the same matter so as to establish the existence of parallel
proceedings is also not addressed.
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be hard to know which party has acted opportunistically, the elements of abuse and the threat to the efficient administration of
justice are almost inevitably present. While both parties may have
contributed to an abuse in that they have produced a situation that
breaches the edict that "[a] s far as possible, a multiplicity of legal
proceedings should be avoided, '3 it is also extremely unlikely that
neither has done so. In short, with parallel proceedings, it's ajungle
out there.
And so it was with considerable interest that many individuals
looked on as the hearing of the appeal in Westec Aerospace Inc. v.
Raytheon Aircraft Co .4approached in the Supreme Court of Canada.
It was the first opportunity for the Court to consider directly the
relevance of parallel proceedings in determinations of appropriate
forum. Unfortunately, hopes for an authoritative pronouncement
from the Court were disappointed when the appeal was dismissed
without reasons. As the record shows, Raytheon had obtained summary judgment in its Kansas declaratory action and there was,
therefore, no longer a situation of parallel proceedings on which to
base the appeal. The challenges presented by parallel proceedings
are likely to become more prevalent as litigants take advantage of
the increased flexibility in jurisdiction selection that is made possible under the current Canadian law relating to jurisdiction and
judgments. For this reason, despite the lack of an authoritative
pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the issues, they are ripe
for comment.
This article takes a bird's eye view of the emergence of parallel
proceedings as an issue in transnational litigation, and it considers the various approaches that have been taken, including the
rules that have emerged to deal with them. It seeks to link these
approaches with the views of comity that are held in particular legal
systems and the particular conditions in which such situations arise
in an effort to conceive of an approach that would be suitable for
Canadian courts. While there is reason to be confident that Canadian courts will make sound decisions in individual cases, an awareness of the range of situations in which parallel proceedings may
be commenced and of the implications of the various responses
that have been established elsewhere to parallel proceedings could
Section 138 of the Courts ofJustice Act, RSO 1990, c.34.
Westec Aerospace Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. (1999), 84 A.C.W.S. ( 3 d) 479, leave
to appeal granted, 86 A.C.W.S. ( 3 d) 697, reversed (1999), 17 3 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 498
(CA), appeal dismissed without reasons, 200 1, S.C.C. 26 [hereinafter lVestec].
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assist in developing an approach that will reduce the opportunities
for abuse without compromising fairness.
THE EMERGING CHALLENGE OF PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS

Given the seriousness of the problems that parallel proceedings
represent, one might wonder why the issues that they raise have not
yet been canvassed at length and why effective means for dealing
with them have not yet been devised. Surprisingly, they are a relatively new phenomenon, which is the by-product of technological
advances in communication and increased mobility.5 In the past,
the logistics of commencing two proceedings in different fora in
order to gain strategic advantages have militated against such
proceedings.
Parallel proceedings are a relatively new phenomenon also
because, until the advent of a liberal regime for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, defendants with assets in
countries applying the traditional Anglo-American enforcement
rules generally had considerable defacto control over a plaintiff's
choice of forum - indeed, in many cases, a virtual veto over many
of the fora that a plaintiff might choose. Under the rules for the
enforcement ofjudgments, a plaintiff was generally limited in pursuing an action that would yield an internationally enforceable
judgment either to the defendant's home forum or to one to which
the defendant has consented. 6 It would seem relatively unusual for
defendants to object to litigating in their home forum and to prefer
to travel elsewhere to commence an action, and relatively unusual
for them to object to litigating in a forum to which they had consented and to claim to be entitled to travel elsewhere to commence
an action. If a plaintiff chose a third forum, the judgment would be
enforceable only within it and a defendant would be free to wait
until the plaintiff commenced another proceeding in one of the
other two fora mentioned above, thus obviating the need for the

On the emergence of these issues in Canada, see H.P. Glenn, "The Supreme
Court,Judicial Comity and Anti-suit Injunctions" (1994) 28 U. British Columbia
L. Rev. 193.
6 That is, a forum to which the defendant either zmplacotlv consented, as when the
action was a counterclaim to an action begun by the defendant in that forum, or
explicztly consented, as when the defendant had entered into an agreement to
resolve disputes in that forum.
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defendant to commence a parallel proceeding to pre-empt the
result.
Defendant control over the scope of choice of fora available to
the plaintiff in transnational litigation was standard in the law of
most countries until fairly recently. It continues to be the norm in
cases in which the judgments are enforced outside Canada or outside the federal or regional judgments regime in which they are
obtained. However, there have been three notable exceptions.
First, when the United States was founded, the framers of the
constitution felt that it was necessary to provide more favourable
terms for the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments between
states and so they included in Article IV. i the requirement that
the states give "full faith and credit" to the judicial proceedings of
other states. 7 In time, this requirement gave rise to the "minimum
contacts" doctrine, which permitted plaintiffs to obtain an enforceable judgment in fora other than those in which the defendant
could be served or to which the defendant had consented.8 Second,
when the European Economic Community was established, it was
provided in Article 220 that member states would simplify the
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments. 9 In time, the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Brussels Convention) and the 1988 Lugano Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
7 Article IV. 1 of the United States constitution provides in part that "[f] ull faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial
Proceedings of every other State." US Constitution, Art. IV, para. 1. A similar
requirement to give full faith and credit is found in section 1 18 of the Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act (Imp.), 19oo, 63 and 64 Vict., c. 2,
which provides, "[f] ull faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of
every State."
It must be acknowledged that these rules have also been applied to foreign judgments in many American states under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments

Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1962).
9 Article 220

of the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
states, in part, that "Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ...
the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards."

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 1973, Gr. Brit. T. S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179 - II), art. 220.

16o
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Commercial Matters were established"' in order to permit bases
of jurisdiction for reciprocally enforceable judgments other than
the defendant's domicile or the defendant's consent. Third, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in MorguardInvestments Ltd v. De Savoye I in which Canadian courts were required to
recognize the jurisdiction of other courts issuing judgments not
only where jurisdiction had been exercised on one of the traditional bases mentioned above (that is, the presence or consent of
the defendant) but also where jurisdiction had been exercised on
the basis of a real and substantial connection between the matter
and the forum.
These departures from the traditional model of recognition
and enforcement ofjudgments altered the conditions under which
fora are chosen and thereby facilitated the prospect of parallel
proceedings. By increasing the range of plaintiff choice in forum
selection, they increased the opportunities for plaintiffs to manipulate the outcome of dispute resolution through the choices they
made and they increased the range of opportunities for defendants to respond by choosing a different forum and commencing
a parallel action. This increase resulted whether the choice was
itself manipulative or a response to a manipulative choice by the
plaintiff. Each of these departures from the traditional model has
emerged in a slightly different federal or regional context, and each
has given rise to a slightly different mechanism for dealing with
parallel proceedings. A brief review of various mechanisms within
the context of the schemes for the recognition and enforcement
ofjudgments in which they have been developed will help to identify some of the considerations relevant to the development of a
suitable mechanism for Canada.
Before embarking on this review, a clarification is in order. Each
of these departures has occurred as part of a federal or regional
10 Brussels Convention onJurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ.N.L.
304, October 30, 1978 and Cmnd. 7395 [hereinafter Brussels Convention],
modified in 1995 to incorporate a reference to the 1988 Lugano Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(1989), 28 I.L.M. 62o [hereinafter Lugano Convention], which is now EC Regulation No. 44/2001 of December 22, 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in CiN il and Commercial Matters, Official
Journal L 12, 16/o1/2001 p. I [hereinafter EC Regulation No. 44/20011.
Morguard hIvestneits Ltd. v. De Savoye, [199o]
Morguard].

3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafter
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regime and has thereby been a departure from the norm for the
international recognition and enforcement of judgments for the
purposes of facilitating that regime. While one approach to international parallel proceedings has been proposed by a committee of
the International Law Association (ILA) 12 and another approach is
contained in the Preliminary Draft Convention onJurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,13 there is no
established approach to international parallel proceedings yet in
place. Indeed, it would not be expected that there would be one
in the absence of a multilateral arrangement for the recognition
and enforcement of judgments because it would be the arrangement itself that would foster parallel proceedings and necessitate
such a response.
Nevertheless, the Westec 14 appeal did involve international parallel litigation. 5 To the extent that parallel proceedings are facilitated
by special arrangements for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, such as those found in federal and regional
systems, it might be thought that the rules appropriate for international and inter-provincial parallel litigation would differ. Yet, the
BC Court of Appeal made no distinction between them, possibly
because the Canadian rules that were developed for inter-provincial
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments have since been applied
to international cases. Still, a distinction between inter-provincial
and international parallel litigation might be a relevant consideration, and, despite the fact that the issues came before the Supreme
Court of Canada in an international case, it could be helpful to
begin by developing an approach based on parallel litigation in
Canadian courts and then to consider the extent to which the
12

International Law Association [hereinafter ILA], Committee on International

Civil and Commercial Litigation, Third Interim Report: Declining and Referring
Jurnsdzction in InternationalLitigation,which includes the Leuven-London Principles and which is available online at <http://www.ila-hq.org>.
13 Which was prepared as part of the negotiations under the auspices of the
Hague Conference for a Multilateral Judgments Convention, entitled Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission, October 30, 1999,
available online at <www.hcch.net/e/conventions/ draft3 6e.html>.
14 Westec, supra note 4.
15 Although the precedent on which the British Columbia Court of Appeal relied

-which was laid down in 47290o BC Ltd. v. Thrifty Canada (1998), 168 D.L.R.
( 4 th) 602 (BCCA) [hereinafter Thrifty] - involved inter-prov2nual parallel
litigation
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approach could apply to situations in which the other proceeding
was underway in a foreign court. This is the process by which the
Canadian approach to jurisdiction and judgments developed, and
it focuses the analysis most effectively on the particular view of
comity taken by the Canadian courts.
THE AMERICAN DIVIDE: THE COMITY AND
VEXATIOUSNESS STANDARDS

The review begins with the American approach to parallel proceedings. 16 The United States is the oldest common law federal
system and it, therefore, represents the first approach to parallel
proceedings that was developed. When the founders of the United
States established the requirement that courts in the United States
give full faith and credit to judicial decisions emanating from other
states in the union, they also established, albeit unwittingly, the conditions that fostered parallel proceedings.17 The minimum contacts
doctrine, which defines a generous scope for judicial jurisdiction,
provides ample opportunity for the commencement of parallel
proceedings, and the due process guarantees, which underlie the
minimum contacts doctrine, have not been regarded as requiring
restraints on parallel litigation.
Although Canadians might regard the wastefulness and the risk
of inconsistent results in parallel litigation as fundamental concerns warranting action, there has been a marked ambivalence
about the need to prevent parallel proceedings from going forward
in the United States. This ambivalence seems to be a result of the
nature of American legal tradition, in which there exists a tension
See generally, L. Teitz, "Parallel Proceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity"
(2000) 34 Int'l Lawyer 545.
17 Early on in the history of the law ofjurisdiction in the United States, the United

States Supreme Court determined that full faith and credit could be a source of
unfairness to defendants if there were not some restrictions placed on the choice
of forum available to plaintiffs: Pennoyerv Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In time,
these restrictions came to be associated with the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, which prohibited the
deprivation of property without due process of law. Eventually, the due process
requirements gave rise to the minimum contacts doctrine by which courts were
constitutionally required to confine their exercise ofjurisdiction in in personam
claims to matters with "sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to
make it reasonable and just according to our traditional notions of fair play
and substantialjustice to permit the state" to assumejurisdiction over the defendant. InternatzonalShoe Co. v. State ofWashizngton, 326 U.S. 310, 320 66 S. Ct. 154
(1945).
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between the desire to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and the
obligation of courts to give effect to the policies of the forum in
the course of adjudicating private party disputes. This tension has
resulted in carefully circumscribed limits on the capacity of the
courts to take steps to resolve situations of parallel proceedings.
In considering whether to grant a stay to resolve a competition
between fora, the United States Supreme Court has held that in
cases in which the parallel proceedings are in federal and state
courts in the United States, "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the
reliefbeing sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary."' Where the relief being sought is mandated by statute, the court must not abstain
from hearing the case. There is some doubt about whether this
should prevent a court in the United States from granting a stay in
favour of a foreign proceeding that is already underway in international situations. 9 Still, in deciding whether they should grant
stays, American courts have rarely distinguished situations of parallel litigation from situations in which stays are sought on the basis
of forum non conveniens.20 The concerns raised for American courts
by parallel litigation seem limited to the threat that it poses tojudicial efficiency. While this limitation might seem to support a rule
requiring deference to the forum in which the proceedings were
first commenced, courts have tended to engage in a case-specific
review, whereby they do not defer to a foreign proceeding that has
been commenced first if the local proceeding has progressed further by the time the stay is sought.21
In considering whether to grant injunctions, courts in some
parts of the United States have been more troubled by parallel litigation than courts in other parts. Two approaches have emerged:
one that is based on "comity" and one that is based on "vexatiousness." In the comity-based approach, courts have avoided interfering whenever possible in proceedings before other courts, and
11 Quackenbushv. Allstatelns. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1996) [emphasis added].
19 Posnerv. Essex Ins Co., 178 F 3 d 1209, 1223 (sith Cir 1999); Goldhammerv.

20
21

Dunkzn 'Donuts, 59 F Supp 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass. 1999); Evergreen MarineCorp. v
Welgrowlnt'lInc., 954 F Supp l1, 1O4 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y 1997); EFCOCorp.v. Aluma
Sys USA Inc., 983 F Supp 816, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1997); Abdullah Sayid RajabAl-Pafai
& Sonsv. McDonnellDouglasForezgn Sales Corp, 988 F Supp 1285, 1291 (ED Mo.
1997).
See Amencan Cyanzmid Co. v. Picaso-Anstalt,741 F Supp 1150 , 1154 (D. NJ 199o).

ind.
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they have refrained from issuing anti-suit injunctions unless it
is necessary to do so in order to protect the jurisdiction of the
United States forum or to prevent the evasion of important public policies.2 2 Under the comity-based approach, the emphasis on
non-interference in foreign proceedings has meant that parallel
proceedings are often tolerated and are not regarded as a sufficient
basis on which to issue anti-suit injunctions.23 The version of comity
that provides the rationale for this approach is one that requires
deference to another court's obligation to discharge the policies of
the forum with respect to the claim made by the plaintiff before it.
In the approach based on vexatiousness or oppressiveness, the
courts are prepared to enjoin proceedings in other courts where
those proceedings would frustrate local polices, where they are vexatious or oppressive, where they threaten the local forum'sjurisdiction, or where they could produce delay, inconvenience, expense,
inconsistency, or a race to judgment. 24 Under the vexatiousnessbased approach, the duplicative nature of foreign proceedings and
the potential for "unwarranted inconvenience, expense and vexation" are relevant considerations, 25 as is the potential for inconsistent results2 in determining whether or not to grant an injunction,
apart from the general considerations relating to appropriate
22

See, for example, Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlnes, 731 F 2d 9o9,
926-27 (DC Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Laker]. This is the standard not only in the

21

DC Circuit, as indicated in the Lakerdecision, but also in the Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits as indicated in China Trade andDev. Corp. v. SsanyongShippingCo.,
837 F 2d 33, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter China Trade]; Compagnie Des
Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 651 F 2d 877 ( 3 d Cir. 1981) cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1 105 (1982); and Gau Shan, Ltd. N Bankers Trust Co., 956 F 2d
1349 (6' Cir. 1992).
China Trade, supranote 22.

21

See, for example, Kaepa, Inc v. Achilles Corp., 76 F 3 d 624 (5"' Cir. 1996) [here-

inafter Kaepa]. This case is the standard not only in the Fifth Circuit as indicated
by the Kaepa decision but also in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, as indicated in the Allendale Mutual case, i fra note 2 5, and in the decisions in Caigill,
Inc. v. HartfordAcc. and Inden Co., 531 F Supp 7 1o (D Minn. 1982 ) [hereinafter
Cargill] and Seattle Totems Hockey Clubv. The NationalHockey League, 652 F 2d 852
(91' Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 US 1 105 (1982) [hereinafter Seattle Totems].
2 Kaepa, supra note 24. See also Allendale Mutuallns. Co. v. Bull Data Svs., lo F 3 d
425, 431 (7' Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Allendale Mutual], which indicates that the
difference between the two standards was the desire to have evidence of an
impairment to comity arising from an anti-suit injunction before refusing an
injunction on that basis.
2
1 See Seattle Totems, supra note 24; and Cargill,supra note 24.
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forum. It is not clear whether this approach is less concerned with
comity per se or whether it is based on a different version of comity
- one that is more like that which is found in the English jurisprudence discussed later in this article.
The approaches taken in the United States to parallel proceedings would appear to be very similar to those that are likely to be
endorsed in Canada under the traditional rules, yet in many ways
they are quite different. The approaches taken in the United States
demonstrate confidence in the courts' ability to determine which is
the more appropriate forum and to act, either by way of stay or
injunction, to resolve a competition between proceedings as warranted. However, there is a perceived obligation of non-interference
that is derived from the deep-seated commitment to forum independence and the recognition of the duty of the courts to assert
local policies of the forum. 27 This seems to be far less compelling to
Canadian courts, which are therefore less apt to tolerate parallel
litigation. Indeed, the use of the term "comity" in the United States
to describe a form of respect shown through non-interference
seems different from the mutual support and cooperation that is
normally associated with the term in Canada as it is used to
describe, for example, the currently expanded scope with which to
recognize and enforce judgments. 28 Therefore, it would seem likely
that the higher level of interest in Canadian courts in resolving a
27 An interesting analogue to this exists in the "public interest factors," which have

been endorsed by the US Supreme Court as being relevant in deciding whether
to grant a stay based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Gulf Oil Corp. v
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 5o8-o9 (1947). These factors included the need to manage
court congestion, to prevent undue burden on the public for jury duty, to facilitate the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, and to
resolve a matter in a forum that will be in a position to apply its own law. The
Canadian jurisprudence on the granting of stays based on the doctrine offorum
non conveniens suggests that public interest factors such as this are unlikely to be
considered, let alone to outweigh factors that relate primarily to the relative convenience to the parties and the relative logistical and administrative efficiency of
resolving the matter in the alternative fora.
21 See Morguard, supra note ii. See also United States of America v. Ivey, (1996) 26
O.R. (3 d) 533 (Gen. Div.), aff'd. (1996) 30 O.R. (3 d) (CA), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused S.C.C. Bulletin, 1997, p. 1043. in which the court observed that
the principle of comity should inform the development of the law in the area of
the foreign public law exception to the enforcement ofjudgments and that "[1]n
an area of law dealing with such obvious and significant transborder issues, it is
particularly appropriate for the forum court to give full faith and credit to the
laws and judgments of neighbouring states." This is a view of comity that emphasizes active support and cooperation more than restraint and deference.
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multiplicity of actions and avoiding the risk of inconsistent results
would prompt Canadian courts to search out a more orderly and
certain means of resolving them. For a more orderly means, they
might consider the European approach.
THE EUROPEAN "FIRST- SEISED" RULE

Once the drafters of the Brussels Convention, which is now the
Brussels I Regulation, 29 decided to pursue a convention that provided both for the obligation to enforce the judgments of other
members states and for the jurisdictional standards of member
state's courts, it was clear that the resulting potential for parallel
proceedings would need to be addressed. Numerous provisions in
the regulation prohibit the exercise of forms of exorbitantjurisdiction that are available under the national laws of member states, but
the remaining scope for jurisdiction continues to be broad. In the
absence of a mechanism for declining jurisdiction on a discretionary basis, the obligation to give effect to the judgments of member
states "without any special procedure being required" eliminates
many of the ways in which courts might otherwise have prevented
the inconsistent results of parallel litigation that is facilitated by the
regulation. In order to address the concerns of multiplicity and
inconsistent results, the Europeans established a simple rule for situations of parallel proceedings or "lis pendens." This rule requires
all courts, other than the court first seized, to stay proceedings on
the same matter before them of their own motion until the court
first seized has decided the matter or has determined that it cannot
3°
decide the matter.

29 EC Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note

io.

31 Special accommodations are made for situations in which a forum other than

the forum first seised has exclusive jurisdiction. The provisions for parallel litigation found in Articles 21-23 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra
note io, are now found in Articles 27-30 of the EC Regulation No. 44/2001,
supranote 1o:
Section 9 -

Lis pendens-

Related actions

Article 27
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the

same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings
until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.
2. Where thejurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other
than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
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The "first-seised" rule is an effective means of eliminating both
the potential for inconsistent results and the tactical manoeuvring
that is associated with the race to judgment. In fact, the sequence in
which courts are seized has been considered by Canadian courts
to be a factor supporting the outcome in at least two cases involving parallel proceedings, but it has only been a supporting factor
and not the decisive factor." The European experience with a prescribed rule, which requires automatic deference to the court first
seized, is instructive. Without any principled means of assuring that
cases are heard in the most appropriate fora, the "first-seised" rule
has been criticized as replacing the unseemly race to judgment with
an equally unseemly "race to the courthouse." It has not prevented
the underlying abuse that is associated with parallel proceedings
in that it has encouraged pre-emptive strikes by litigants wishing to
engage in forum shopping. As a result, the "first-seised" rule has
Article 28
i. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States,

any court other than the court first seised may stay its proceedings.
2.

Where these actions are pending at first instance, any court other than the
court first seised may also, on the application of one of the parties, decline
jurisdiction if the court first seised hasjurisdiction over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof.

3. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where
they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine
them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from
separate proceedings.
Article

29

Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any
court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of
that court.
Article 30
For the purposes of this Section, a court shall be deemed to be seised:
i. at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent

document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service
effected on the defendant, or
if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at the
time when it is received by the authority responsible for service, provided
that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was
required to take to have the document lodged with the court.
3i See, for example, CanadianNationalRalway Co. v. Sydney Steel Corp. (1998), 167
2.

N.S.R. (2d) 28 (S.C.), affd (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4 th) 747 (NS CA) [hereinafter
CanadianNationalRailway]; and Thrifty, supra note 15.
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also been criticized for curtailing pre-litigation efforts to seek a
negotiated result by diverting energy from such negotiations to the
"race to file." In sum, the benefits of order and certainty that would
be gained by embracing a simple, mechanical rule such as the "firstseised" rule of the Brussels I Regulation could come at a considerable price in terms of the interests that Canadian courts have in
discouraging opportunistic forum selection and ensuring that
matters are determined in appropriate fora. It has been observed
that the "first-seised" rule "achieves its purpose, but at a price. The
price is rigidity, and rigidity can be productive of injustice. 3 2 There
is at least one Canadian case in which a court was not persuaded to
defer to the court first seized. This fact raises the question of
whether it is possible to benefit from the assurances that are provided by the "first-seised" rule without its drawbacks.
THE

ILA AND

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE PROPOSALS: COMBINING

THE "FIRsT-SEISED" RULE AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS

Last year, the Committee on International Civil and Commercial
Litigation of the ILA 33 presented a report proposing the "LeuvenLondon Principles." The Leuven-London principles contain an
approach to parallel proceedings that combines the orderliness of
the European "first-seised" rule with the case-specific sensitivity of
appropriate forum analysis, which is undertaken by common law
courts under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The principles
require courts in different jurisdictions that are seized with the
same matter to give the court first seized exclusive carriage of the
matter, but only for the purposes of determining appropriate
forum 3 4 - a determination that would be undertaken in the way
32 Airbus, supra note i.

11 The ILA is an international non-governmental organization established for the
"study, elucidation and advancement of international law, public and private,
the study of comparative law, the making of proposals for the solution of conflicts of law and for the unification of law, and the furthering of international
understanding and goodwill." Its work is carried on primarily through international committees that present reports at biennial conferences for discussion
and endorsement. This report was presented at the sixty-ninth bienniel conference in London in July 2ooo. Information about the ILA is available online at
<http://www.ila-hq.org>.
14 Pursuant to Article 4. 1,"[w] here proceedings involving the same parties and the
same subject-matter are brought in the courts of more than one state, any court
other than the court first seised shall suspend its proceedings until such time as
thejurisdiction of the court first seised is established, and not declined under this
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thatforum non conveniens determinations are made in common law
courts. A similar proposal for resolving situations of parallel proceedings, though more elaborate and detailed, was included in the
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, which was published in
1999 by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law as part of the process of negotiating a
multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments. The Special Commission's proposal also involved a
combination of the "first-seised" rule and the case-specific determination of appropriate forum, based on factors ordinarily found in
35
the common law determinations of forum non conveniens.
Principle, and thereafter it shall terminate its proceedings. The court first seised
shall apply Principle 4.3 [appropriate forum analysis]. Should that court refer
the matter to a court subsequently seised in accordance with Principle 4.3, the
latter court will not be obliged to terminate its proceedings." The commentary
explained that "the Committee gave anxious consideration to whether it ought
to preserve a formal hs pendens rule, or whether it should simply include the existence of parallel litigation as one of factors to be considered by the court as a
ground for referral ofjurisdiction. In the end, it concluded that the special complexities of parallel litigation, which carry with it the problems of conflicts
between courts,justify a separate rule. But the Committee desired to avoid some
of the rigidity, and the potential for forum shopping, which could be the result
of the strict operation of a 'first past the post' rule ...But it departs in the result
radically from the automatic priority on the merits vouchsafed to the court first
seised under the Brussels Convention ...[because what] it does is to give priority to the court first seised in the determination of the appropriate court for the
determination of the merits of the matter. In this way, the Committee considered
that the potential for the abuse of a lispendens system by a race to the courthouse
could be curbed, whilst a specific regime for the determination of priorities
between competing actions was still preserved." ILA, supranote 12.
5 Article

21

- Lis pendens

i. When the same parties are engaged in proceedings in courts of different
Contracting States and when such proceedings are based on the same
causes of action, irrespective of the relief sought, the court second seised
shall suspend the proceedings if the court first seised has jurisdiction and is
expected to render ajudgment capable of being recognised under the Convention in the State of the court second seised, unless the latter has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 4 or 12.
2.

The court second seised shall decline jurisdiction as soon as it is presented
with a judgment rendered by the court first seised that complies with the
requirements for recognition or enforcement under the Convention.

3. Upon application of a party, the court second seised may proceed with the
case if the plaintiff in the court first seised has failed to take the necessary
steps to bring the proceedings to a decision on the merits or if that court
has not rendered such a decision within a reasonable time.
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Adopting these proposed methods would go a long way towards
resolving the difficulties that have been encountered when using
the mechanisms for resolving parallel proceedings that are used in
the American and European systems. On the one hand, these proposed methods would supply the orderliness lacking in the common law system - an orderliness that would prevent the race to
judgment in most situations. On the other hand, these methods
would entail a principled determination of appropriate forum that
is lacking in the European system - a determination that in most
situations would operate to discourage the race to file. If this
approach was to be adopted in a reciprocal international regime,
whether bilateral or multilateral, it might afford the best results
that could presently be obtained in situations of international parallel litigation. Indeed, such a mechanism would seem to be a necessary adjunct to any international regime of enhanced recognition and the enforcement ofjudgments. As explained earlier, such
a regime would increase the scope of forum selection used by litigants and thereby increase the potential for problems associated
with parallel litigation. Moreover, as the commentary on these
4. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs apply to the court second
seised even in a case where the jurisdiction of that court is based on the
national law of that State in accordance with Article 17.
5. For the purpose of this Article, a court shall be deemed to be seised:
a) when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, or
b) if such document has to be served before being lodged with the court,
when it is received by the authority responsible for service or served on
the defendant [as appropriate, universal time is applicable].
6. If in the action before the court first seised the plaintiff seeks a determination that it has no obligation to the defendant, and if an action seeking
substantive relief is brought in the court second seised:
a) the provisions of paragraphs i to 5 above shall not apply to the court
second seised, and
b) the court first seised shall suspend the proceedings at the request of a
party if the court second seised is expected to render a decision capable
of being recognised under the Convention.
7. This Article shall not apply if the court first seised, on application by a
party, determines that the court second seised is clearly more appropriate
to resolve the dispute, under the conditions specified in Article 2 2.
See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 13, which has since been revised to
accommodate other developments in the negotiations.
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proposed methods suggests, they would virtually eliminate the friction caused by the more aggressive remedy - namely, the anti-suit
injunction - by eliminating the need for one court to take unilateral steps to prevent multiplicity by enjoining the plaintiff from
6
proceeding in the other forum.1
Still, there is a sizeable and increasing minority of situations in
which the mechanisms described in these proposals might not
succeed in eliminating the underlying unfairness and abuse. For
instance, in one situation, unfairness might arise because although
both courts have ostensibly applied a principled approach to the
determination of appropriate forum, their standards for granting
stays of proceedings differ enough, either in stringency or in the
nature of the factors considered, for one court not be content to be
bound by the determination of the other. While a less generous
approach to the granting of stays might be suitable in one legal system, it could still be frustrating to a court faced with a parallel proceeding in another legal system that would grant a stay if presented
with the situation faced by the first court. For example, although a
stay may be granted pursuant to Article 3135 of the Quebec Civil
Code3 7 on a discretionary basis on considerations resembling those
that apply in motions for stays based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the standard for doing so is more stringent than that
which applies in common lawjurisdictions. Accordingly, a situation
could arise in which a Quebec court would refuse a stay in circumstances in which another court in Canada would regard a stay of
a Qu6bec proceeding to be warranted. Under circumstances in
which the other Canadian court regarded itself to be a clearly more
appropriate forum, should that court decline to exercise jurisdic38
tion merely because the Quebec court had refused to grant a stay?
36 See ILA, supra note 12.

37 Article 3135 of Book so of the Quebec Civil Code, which deals with the International Jurisdiction of Qubec Authorities, provides that "[e]ven though a
Quebec authority has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may exceptionally and on
an application by a party, decline jurisdiction if it considers that the authorities
of another country are in a better position to decide."
38 Courts in Ontario and in Nova Scotia on at least two occasions have not been willing to grant stays solely on the basis that Quebec courts have refused to grant
stays in parallel proceedings. See Guarantee,infra note 63; and CanadianNational
Railway, supranote 31. However, it should be noted that the Quebec proceedings
in Guarantee,were subsequently stayed by the Quebec Court of Appeal and the
dispute in CanadianNationalRailway was ultimately settled by the parties. See
C. Richter, "Living with Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation," in CBAO Conference
Proceedings, see first unnumbered note.
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In another example, although the courts of both the United States
and the United Kingdom apply the doctrine offorum non conveniens,
their views of what constitutes an appropriate forum and which
factors are relevant for determining which forum is appropriate
differ in ways that have sometimes given rise to rather heated transAtlantic debates.3 9 As mentioned earlier in this article, the obligation to serve the interests of the forum might prevent the granting
of a stay in a court in the United States under circumstances in
which a stay would be thought to be warranted by an English court.
In another situation, unfairness might arise because the defendant cannot travel to the jurisdiction in which the matter has been
commenced in order to seek a stay in that forum. Concerns about
the hardships of litigating in distant fora have usually been raised
in cases involving plaintiffs who find it difficult to travel to commence a claim. But the hardships of responding to a notice of a
distant proceeding and of retaining and instructing local counsel
to defend against a claim in a distant forum are also capable of
producing unfairness in the determination of appropriate forum.
Moreover, being aware of the difficulty that an opposing party
might have in responding to a notice of a distant proceeding could
encourage an opponent to seek an unfair advantage. Even among
the common law provinces of Canada, where the harmonizing
effect of the Supreme Court of Canada tends to ensure that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is applied in a fairly uniform manner, there could still be a risk that the difficulty of responding to
a claim commenced in a court thousands of miles away could be
used to secure a defaultjudgment in an unmeritorious claim simply
because the defendant is not able to challenge the choice of an
inappropriate forum from such a distance.
How should the potential for such situations of unfairness be
addressed? The experience of the English courts could assist since
they are the only common law courts within a regional system otherwise comprised of civil lawjurisdictions that entails a multilateral
judgments regime. The English courts have needed to develop ways
to respond to parallel litigation involving other courts that take a
different approach to the issue of appropriate forum.The English
courts have also needed to develop responses to parallel litigation
in a multi-jurisdictional regime in which the logistics of travelling
to challenge an exercise of jurisdiction could affect a defendant's
See British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., 11985] A.C. 53 and Laker supra
note 2 2.
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ability to ensure that a proceeding does not go forward in a forum
that should decline jurisdiction.
THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE WITH PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
IN EUROPEAN COURTS

The general approach to parallel proceedings that is taken by the
English courts is fairly standard for common law courts. In motions
for stays of local proceedings in situations of parallel litigation,
English courts, like the courts of the United States, Australia, and,
at one time, Canada, have treated the existence of foreign proceedings as merely one more factor in the analysis of appropriate
forum.

40

They have acknowledged that the commencement of par-

allel proceedings in another country could constitute a form of
interference in local proceedings that could warrant the granting
of an injunction. 41 However, the analysis in cases of parallel proceedings remains focused, as it does in the United States, on the
determination of appropriate forum, and the existence of parallel
proceedings operates simply as another factor to be considered.
Where the foreign proceedings are well advanced,4 2 the existence
of parallel proceedings could warrant a stay, but where the parties
have agreed in their contract to resolve disputes in the local
forum 43 or where important issues of local public policy are likely to
be resolved appropriately only in the local forum,44 a stay will not
be granted. What is notably different from the approach under the
Brussels and Lugano regimes, however, is that while it is recognized
that foreign parallel proceedings might be instituted as an abusive
tactic, one that would warrant an injunction, they are not otherwise
40 See L. Collins, ed, Dicey and Morrison the Conflict of Laws, 13th ed. (London- Sweet
and Maxwell, 2ooo) at 400; The Abidin Daver, [1984] A.C. 398 at 411-12; and

P. North andJJ. Fawcett eds, Cheshire and North's PrvateInternationalLaw, 13 th
ed. (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 347-5 o . Although, there seems to be some
recognition that in matters such as those involving divorce decrees the potential

for inconsistent results presents a greater concern. de Dampierrev. de Damp2erre,
[1988] A.C. 92 (HL) and Henry v. Henry (1995), 185 C.L.R. 571 (Aus. HC).
41 South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappy "De Zeven Provnaen,
[1987] A.C. 24,40-41. And see CSRv. CignaInsuranceAustralia
Ltd. (1997), 189

C.L.R. 345 (HC).
o

42 See Cleveland Museum ofArtv. CapricornArt InternationalSA, [ 199 ] Lloyd's Rep.

166.
See Akai Pty Ltdv. People'sInsuranceCo. Ltd, [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 9o .
41See in EIDu Pont de Nemours & Co. v.Agnew and Kerr [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 585
(Eng. CA).
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considered sufficiently problematic per se to warrant steps to eliminate them. Accordingly, in situations of parallel litigation when
another court has refused a stay, it does not necessarily follow that
the multiplicity should be resolved by an injunction.
However, the experience of the English courts in addressing
situations of parallel proceedings within the Brussels and Lugano
regimes - which involves other courts within a regional regime
that take a different approach to the question of appropriate forum
- is more instructive. As discussed earlier, the Brussels regime contains its own mechanism for eliminating parallel proceedings, but,
in rare cases, where litigants demonstrate the potential to evade the
effects of this mechanism, the existence of the enhanced regime
for the recognition and enforcement of judgments will tend to
exacerbate the effects of the abuse underlying the parallel proceedings. As the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Turner
v. Grovit 45 demonstrates, the response that can be evoked by such
abuse reflects a version of comity quite different from the deferent
46
version contemplated by the American jurisprudence.
In Turner,the Court of Appeal granted an injunction to prevent
the continuation of proceedings that were commenced in Spain
by Turner's employer after Turner had made a claim for relief for
constructive dismissal before the Industrial Tribunal in London.
Ordinarily, under the "first-seised" rule, the Spanish court would
have been required to defer to the English tribunal, but the
employer had argued that the Industrial Tribunal was not a court,
that the two sets of proceedings differed from one another and so
were not duplicative, and that, in any event, the English court did
not have authority under the Brussels Convention to issue an antisuit injunction to restrain the pursuit of proceedings in the courts
of another member state. On upholding the injunction, the English
court rejected these propositions and observed that where proceedings are "launched in another Brussels Convention jurisdiction for no purpose other than to harass and oppress a party who
is already a litigant here," the court has the power to enjoin the
plaintiff in the foreign proceeding from continuing the abuse, and
the granting of an injunction "entails not the slightest disrespect to
the Spanish court" because it "would underpin and support the
47
proper application of the Brussels Convention."
4

46

17

Turnerv. Growit, [2000] 1 Q.B. 345 (CA) [hereinafter Turner].
See discussion under the heading 'The American Divide: The Comity and Vexatiousness Standards" earlier in this article.
Turner,supranote 45 at paras. 29 and 43.
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In the Turner case, the English court was faced with an abuse
that drew on both of the concerns about unfairness mentioned earlier in this article. In the view of the English court, the Spanish
court was obliged to stay its proceeding (pursuant to the Brussels
Convention) and so there was no reason to wait to find out whether
the Spanish court would do so. As a result, it was unfair to put
Turner to the trouble of going to Spain to seek this result. The
result in the Turner case illustrates a view of comity in the granting
of injunctions that reflects a different alignment of the underlying
relationships between litigants and courts. In this view of comity,
the granting of an injunction is not a matter of choosing between
the local court's obligation to grant a hearing to the plaintiff that
is before it over the foreign court's obligation to do the same for the
plaintiff that is before it. Rather, the injunction is granted on the
strength of the courts' common interest in preventing an abuse one that could affect proceedings before either court and one that
should be resolved either by a stay or an injunction - once it is
determined which proceedings are abusive - by whichever court is
better placed to do so.
The lesson for Canadian courts as they develop an approach to
parallel proceedings is an interesting one. Where courts operate
within a regime of enhanced recognition and enforcement of
judgments - one in which they take the same approach to the
determination of appropriate forum - their shared interest in
cooperating to eliminate parallel proceedings could reduce their
concern to determine appropriate forum independently. Thus,
Canadian courts might be more willing to defer to determinations
by other Canadian courts of appropriate forum and they might
even be prepared to regard litigants as bound by such determinations. For example, where another Canadian court has already
denied a stay, that determination might be regarded as sufficient to
warrant a stay of the local proceeding. 48 Similarly, one Canadian
court might be less likely to take affront to the granting of an
injunction by another Canadian court to restrain a parallel proceeding. Historically, Canadian courts have demonstrated considerable reluctance about taking such pre-emptive steps in matters
that they feel should be decided by other courts, 49 but this could
48 As was the case in Thrzfty, supra note 15. However, see CanadzanNationalRailway,

supra note 31.
4' See Huntv. T &Nplc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [hereinafter Hunt], in which the
British Columbia courts hesitated to pronounce on the constitutionality of a
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change should such a step seem warranted 0 to prevent an abuse for instance, situations in which the approach to comity taken in
Turner v. Grovit would seem applicable.
The lessons for Canadian courts that can be found in the experience of the English courts could extend beyond refining the
approach to injunctions. Developing appropriate responses to
parallel proceedings might also help in refining the approach to
determining which proceeding should be eliminated. For example,
it was once thought that an action for a declaration that the plaintiff was not liable to the defendant (a "negative declaration") was
likely to be commenced only as a pre-emptive strike on forum selection, that is, as a means to secure a trial in a forum other than the
one likely to be chosen by the party to the dispute who would seek
substantive relief (the "natural plaintiff").51 Clearly, negative declarations could be particularly effective as a tactic of this sort in a
regime such as exists in Europe, where the court first seized has
carriage of the matter. But they could also be effective in situations
where the "natural plaintiff" was not in a position to travel to challenge the choice of forum by the applicant for the declaration. In
either situation, it would constitute an abuse. Accordingly, negative
declarations were once treated with considerable suspicion. However, as the recent English experience demonstrates, 2 it might be
appropriate to seek a negative declaration in a situation in which
the opposing party was about to commence a proceeding in a
forum that was less appropriate but that might not relinquish
jurisdiction in a forum that was less appropriate but that would be

Qubec blocking statute that impeded litigation before them. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, the court found that the British Columbia courts had
jurisdiction to make such a determination and that the statute was constitutionally inapplicable to litigation in Canadian courts.
10 It is arguable that the act of certifying a multi-province plaintiff case in a class
action - an act that has gained the approval of a number of courts - has virtually the same preclusive effect (subject of course to the plaintiff class members'
entitlement to exclude themselves from the class). See Harringtonv.Dow Corning
(1997), 29 B.C.L.R. ( 3 d) 88, aff'd (2ooo), 19 3 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 67 (BCCA) leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused, S.C.C. Bulletin 200 1 at 1540; Wilson v. Servier Canada
Ltd (2000), 50 OR. ( 4 th) 219, leave to appeal to Div. Court, refused 52 O.R
( 4 a) 20, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, S.C.C. Bulletin 2oo at 1539.
B See The Volvox Hollandia, [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 361 at 371 (CA).
52 On negative declarations, see MessierDowtyv. Sabena, [2000] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 428

(CA). See also L. Collins, Essays in InternationalLitigation and the Conflict of Laws
(Oxford- Clarendon Press, 1994).
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logistically difficult for the defendant to challenge. In other words,
in developing a mechanism to respond to parallel proceedings, it
might be necessary to review the assumption that it is abusive to
attempt to secure access to a particular forum by seeking a negative
declaration. 53 There might be nothing abusive about commencing an action for a declaration in an appropriate forum where
there is a genuine risk that a claim might otherwise be commenced
in a less appropriate forum from which the proceeding could not
be dislodged. In addition, there might be nothing abusive about
a party who has been repeatedly threatened with proceedings
(whether or not in an inappropriate forum) taking the step of
commencing an action for a declaration in order to resolve outstanding issues of liability.
In time, Canadian courts will develop sophisticated responses
to the various strategies that emerge from the greater flexibility
in forum selection that is available under the current enhanced
rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. These
responses will include a means of identifying which of the proceedings should go forward and a means for terminating the proceedings that should not go forward. Still, as they refine their
approach, Canadian courts are likely to come to regard the traditional mechanisms of independent fora - stays, injunctions, and
negative declarations - as being, in the final analysis, fairly crude
tools for addressing the increased complexity of the issues of jurisdiction and forum that give rise to parallel litigation. This perception could provide fresh impetus to develop a mechanism for
transfers of proceedings, such as that which operates in the Australian cross-vesting scheme, as a more effective means of addressing many of the concerns that give rise to parallel proceedings and
make them difficult to resolve.
TRANSFERS OF PROCEEDINGS -

THE AUSTRALIAN

CROSS-VESTING LEGISLATION

Initially developed to address the jurisdictional complexities of
the Australian federal judicial system, the cross-vesting scheme
emerged from the proposals formulated for the Australian Constitutional Conventions in the 197os and early 198os, and taken up by

Or one seeking a declaration that ajudgment in a particular proceeding would
not be enforceable.
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the Solicitors-General who prepared the legislation. 54 The scheme
is composed of concurrent enactments of the states, territories,
and the Commonwealth and is entitled the Jurisdiction of Courts
(Cross-Vesting) Act 1987, which vest every other Australian court
to the largest extent possible with the jurisdiction of the enacting
jurisdiction's courts. 55 In achieving the maximum flexibility in
choice ofjurisdiction, it became necessary to develop a mechanism
to ensure that this flexibility was not abused and that matters were
disposed of in appropriate fora. This was achieved by providing for
the transfer of matters to more appropriate fora either upon the
56
application of a party or by the court itself.
The cross-vesting scheme mandates the transfer of a proceeding
in situations involving related proceedings in different courts, situations in which the receiving court would have had jurisdiction
without the cross-vesting scheme, situations involving the interpretation of another jurisdiction's law, and when it was otherwise in
14

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987, (Cth). The cross-vesting initiative was all the more effective for having been undertaken by the solicitorsgeneral of the Australian states led by the Solicitor-General of Australia, Dr.
Gavan Griffith, Q.C., because, as the senior counsel for the governments in Australia, they had the procedural expertise and experience necessary to craft a
scheme that would work well within the Australian judicial system.

11 Unfortunately, the seamless efficiency of the operation of the cross-vesting
scheme was impaired by a 1999 High Court determination in Re Wakzm; Ex parte
McNally (1999), 163 A.L.R. 270 that the state courts were constitutionally
incapable of vesting their jurisdiction in the Federal Court. Still, the vesting of
jurisdiction between state courts, which is the feature of the model of primary
relevance for the Canadian federation, remains intact.
56The operative provision in the cross-vesting legislation reads as follows:
5(1) Where(a) proceeding (in this sub-section referred to as the "'relevant proceeding") is
pending in the Supreme Court of a State or Territory (in this sub-section
referred to as the "first court"); and
(b)it appears to the first court thati) the relevant proceeding arises out of, or is related to, another proceeding
pending in . . [another Australian court] and it is more appropriate that
the relevant proceeding be determined by... [the other Australian court];
ii) having regard to(c) the interests ofjusticeit is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding be determined by... [the
other Australian court], as the case may be; or
iii)
it is otherwise in the interests ofjustice that the relevant proceeding be
determined by... [the other Australian court],the first court shall transfer the relevant proceeding to ...[the other Australian court], as the case may be.
SeeJurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act, supra note 54.

The Westec Appeal
the interests of justice. There is no onus on the application for a
transfer, the principles of forum non conveniens do not apply, and
no appeal is available following a decision to transfer, 57 as this was
not intended to be the kind of cumbersome deliberative exercise
properly reserved for judicial determinations of the merits, but
rather an administrative decision - "a 'nuts and bolts' manage58
ment decision."
The Australian cross-vesting scheme is not the only example of a
mechanism for transfers of proceedings that has been proposed or
developed. A similar scheme operates in the American federal system. The diversityjurisdiction of the Federal Courts was created to
enable those courts to act as neutral fora for disputes between persons of different states, and the transfer mechanism in section
1404 of the United States Code permits changes of venue between
districts or divisions in the Federal Court system. 9 In addition,
in Canada, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada proposed a
transfer mechanism in Part 3 of the Uniform Court Jurisdiction
and Proceedings Transfer Act. 60 This proposal was, in some ways,
even more ambitious than the cross-vesting scheme. Not only would
it permit courts to send or to receive a transfer of the whole of a
matter or a part of a matter, it would also permit international
transfers between participating courts. However, the act is not yet
been proclaimed in force in any of the Canadian provinces. Finally,
the Leuven-London Principles, which were discussed earlier in this
article, also contain a mechanism for transfer, which is described as
"-referral"for dealing with matters commenced in the wrong forum.61
51 See A. Mason andJ. Crawford, "The Cross-Vesting Scheme" (1988) 62 Admin.

L.J. 328; G. Griffith, D. Rose, and S. Gageler, "Further Aspects of the CrossVesting Scheme" (1988) 62 Admin. LJ. ioi6. While there was no appeal, it
would seem that an error could be corrected by sending the matter back from
whence it came, which could occur either on motion of a party or on the receiving court's own motion.
58 BankinvestAGv. Seabrook (1988), 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711 at 714.
59 28 U.S.C.A. para. 1404.
60 Uniform Law Conference of Canada, "Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Pro-

61

ceedings Transfer Act" in Proceedings (ULCC, 1994), which can be found
online at <http://www.ulcc.ca>.
Principle 5 provides
5.1 On the hearing of an application under Principle 4.3 [for forum non
conveniens-like relief], and subject to any terms of referral under Principle 5.3,
the applicant shall satisfy the originating court that the alternative court:
(a) has and will exercise jurisdiction over the matter; and
(b) is likely to render its judgment on the merits within a reasonable time.

18o
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There is a great deal to recommend the establishment of a transfer mechanism within Canada for proceedings that could more
suitably be determined in fora other than those in which they have
been commenced. Such a mechanism would be an effective means
of preventing or resolving instances of parallel proceedings. Perhaps, in time, Part 3 of the Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, which deals with transfers of proceedings,
will be considered for adoption even if Part 2, which codifies court
jurisdiction is not.
EMERGING ELEMENTS OF A CANADIAN APPROACH:

A "SECOND-SEIZED"

RULE?

The foregoing survey of the experiences of federal and regional
systems with mechanisms for parallel litigation has identified some
of the concerns that might apply to Canadian courts and some of
the features of the models to which Canadian courts might refer in
developing an approach tailored to their needs. When these concerns and features are considered in the context of the growing
jurisprudence on parallel proceedings in Canada, the significance
of certain elements begins to emerge.

5.2 The originating court may communicate directly with the alternative court
on any application for referral in order to obtain information relevant to its
determination under Principle 4, where such communication is permitted
by the respective states. States are encouraged to permit their courts to
make, and respond to, such communications. Any such communication
shall be either on the application of one of the parties or on its own motion.
Where the court acts on its own motion it shall give reasonable notice to the
parties of its intention to do so, and hear the parties on the information to be
sought. The originating court shall either communicate in writing or otherwise on the record. It shall communicate in a language acceptable to the
alternative court.
5.3 The parties and the originating court are encouraged to consider appropriate terms of referral. These may deal in particular with:
(a) the applicant's submission to the jurisdiction of the alternative court;
(b) the terms on which the applicant may assert a defence of limitation or
prescription of action in the alternative court.
5.4 Save where the international convention provides otherwise, the originating
court, if satisfied of the matters in paragraph 5.1, shall on an order to
decline jurisdiction either suspend further proceedings at least until the
jurisdiction of the alternative court has been established, or, where national
law provides, terminate its proceedings.
ILA, supra note 12.
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In the Canadian common law jurisprudence on parallel proceedings, five decisions stand out: two involving parallel proceedings in a common law province and in Quebec, a third involving
parallel proceedings in Ontario andJapan, and two other decisions
involving the courts of British Columbia and Ontario. Taken in
chronological order, they seem to follow the same pattern similar
to that indicated by the various issues and concerns outlined earlier
in this article.
62
In 1994, in GuaranteeCo. ofNorth America v. Gordon CapitalCorp.,
which involved a dispute over a claim on an insurance bond, the
Ontario courts refused to stay a proceeding that was commenced
two weeks after a proceeding on the same matter had been commenced in Quebec. The court held that the prior commencement
of proceedings in Quebec was not a reason per se to grant a stay and
that a stay should be refused because it had not been shown that
Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum. The court saw no
reason why both proceedings could not continue. Significantly,
there was no suggestion that the granting of an injunction restraining the Quebec proceedings necessarily followed from the refusal
of a stay of the Ontario proceedings. This decision appears to
reflect the traditional approach taken in common law courts and,
in particular, the "comity"-based approach that is followed by some
of the United States courts in which parallel proceedings are generally tolerated. Interestingly, the Quebec Superior Court had
refused a stay sought on the grounds of forum non conveniens in
November 1993, because the Civil Code provision in Article 3135
for the granting of discretionary stays on this basis had not yet
come into force, but in 1995 the Quebec Court of Appeal relied
upon the authority in this article to stay the matter. 63 Also worth
noting is the fact that the Quebec Civil Code contains a provision in
Article 3137 specifically recognizing the independent significance
of parallel proceedings. 64 Unlike the provision in the Brussels I
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Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp. (1994), 18 O.R. ( 3 d) 9

63

(Gen. Div ), leave to appeal to Div Ct refused, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,
[1994] S.C.C.A. No. 304 [hereinafter Guarantee].
Gordon CapitalCorp. c. Garantie,Cie d'assurancede l'Amtrique du Nord, C.S.M. 500-
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05-009714-930, [1995] R.DJ. 537 (C.A.).
Article 3137 provides: "On the application of a party, a Qunbec authority may
stay its ruling on an action brought before it if another action between the same
parties, based on the same facts and having the same object is pending before a
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Regulation, Article 3137 permits a Quebec court to stay its proceeding but does not require it to do so.
In 1997, in Hudon v. Geos Language Corporation,65 the Ontario
Divisional Court upheld the granting of an anti-suit injunction to
restrain proceedings commenced in Japan by Geos Language Corporation for a declaration that it was not liable to Hudon. Hudon
had commenced an action in Ontario, and Geos had sought a stay
of the proceeding. The Divisional Court was not prepared to hold
that the determination by the Ontario court that Ontario was an
appropriate forum was a decisive factor in determining whether an
anti-suit injunction should be issued, but it did hold that it was not
necessary for Hudon to seek a stay of the Japanese proceeding in
order to qualify for an order restraining Geos from continuing it.
Thus, the possibility of treating one court's determination of
appropriate forum as binding on the litigants in both proceedings
was raised. Further, the court seemed moved by considerations that
were similar to those in the Turnercase66 in that it regarded the subsequent Japanese proceedings as an effort to take advantage of a
forum that was either unlikely to be persuaded to relinquish jurisdiction or that would be a difficult forum for the plaintiff to reach
to seek a stay.
67
In 1998, in Canadian National Railway Co. v. Sydney Steel Corp.,
which involved a dispute over the supply of steel rails, the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Chambers judge
refusing to stay a local proceeding in favour of a proceeding commenced subsequently in Quebec. The Court of Appeal made this
decision despite the fact that the Quebec courts had refused a stay
and they had decided that they should determine which forum
was the appropriate forum because they had determined that Qu&
bec law should apply. 68 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was not
persuaded that estoppel applied to the determination of appropriate forum by the Qu~bec courts (which was interlocutory under
Quebec law) or that comity required the Nova Scotia courts to defer
foreign authority, provided that the latter action can result in a decision which
may be recognized in Quebec, or if such a decision has already been rendered by
a foreign authority."
Hudon v. Geos Language Corporation (1997), 34 O.R. ( 3 d) 14 (Div. Ct) [hereinafter Hudon]
Turner,supra note 45.
CanadianNationalRailway, supra note 31 at para. 2 2.
(18 Sydney SteelCorp. c. CanadianNationalRailway(Sept 8, 1997) 500-05-026912-962
(C.S.), appeal dismissed (March 13, 1998) 500-09-005566-971 (C.A.).
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to that determination. Instead, the Court of Appeal observed: "[I] f
any deference is to be shown, it would be to the jurisdiction in
which proceedings were first commenced." While the Court of
Appeal permitted the multiplicity to continue, it demonstrated sensitivity to the kinds of concerns that could ultimately lead to the
development of a mechanism for resolving parallel proceedings.
Implicit in its reasoning was the recognition of the importance of
resolving a multiplicity of proceedings as well as the importance of
establishing a common standard for determining appropriate
forum so that it would be suitable for one court to defer to the decision of another.
The real breakthrough for the common law courts in Canada,
however, came in the 1998 decision of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in 47290o BC Ltd v. Thrifty Canada,6 9 when it overruled a leading precedent7 ° that had emphasized the traditional
approach of forum independence. In the Thrifty case, a dispute had
arisen over the franchise agreement between 4729oo, a British
Columbia company, and Thrifty, an Ontario company. Thrifty sued
472900 in Ontario, and, five days later, 472900 sued Thrifty in
British Columbia. 4729oo asked the Ontario court to stay its proceeding in favour of the British Columbia proceeding but this
request was refused because there was a clause in the parties' agreement attorning to the Ontario courts and the case could be tried in
either forum "without great difficulty for either side." An application for leave to appeal the Ontario decision was denied. Thrifty
then sought a stay of the British Columbia proceeding and, on
appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the stay was
granted as a matter of comity between the provinces of Canada, with
the explicit acknowledgment that the matter of appropriate forum
had already been considered by the Ontario courts and that this
point was a relevant factor in the determination. Although the decision in Thrifty focused primarily on providing reasons for the result
that the court had reached rather than on the method that might be
adopted by courts in the future for resolving situations of parallel
proceedings, the result would appear to advocate a process resem71
bling that which was proposed in the Leuven-London principles.
69 Thrifty, supranote' 5.
70 Which was set in Avenue Properties Ltd v. First City Development Corp. (1986), 32

D L.R. ( 4 th) 40 (BC CA).
71 See the discussion under the heading "The ILA and The Hague Conference Pro-

posals: Combining the 'First-Seised' Rule and Forum Non Convenens" earlier in
this article.
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The Thrifty decision is a particularly compelling precedent because
it was established in a situation in which a court was cedingjurisdiction to another court explicitly for the purposes of resolving a
multiplicity and not a situation in which a court was claimingjurisdiction for itself.
Finally, in Westec Aerospace Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 72 which
involved a commercial dispute between Westec, a British Columbia
company, and Raytheon, a Kansas company, over a contract to supply computer software and hardware. While Westec's offer to settle
was still outstanding, Raytheon commenced an action in Kansas
for a declaration that it had not breached its contract with Westec
and that Westec had not suffered any damage caused by Raytheon.
Westec then commenced an action in British Columbia against
Raytheon for breach of contract. Raytheon sought a stay of the
British Columbia proceedings, which was refused by the Chambers
judge but granted by the Court of Appeal. Citing the decision in
Thrifty, the Court of Appeal endorsed the following test:
Where parallel proceedings are alleged, as they are in the case at bar,
Thrifty Canada invites the following analysis:
1. Are

there parallel proceedings underway in anotherjurisdiction?
If so, is the otherjurisdiction an appropriate forum for the resolution of
the dispute?
3. Assuming there are parallel proceedings in another appropriate forum,
has the plaintiff established objectively by cogent evidence that there is
some personal or juridical advantage that would be available to him
only in the British Columbia action that is of such importance that it
would cause injustice to him to deprive him of it?73
2.

Like the Thrifty decision, the decision of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal is a compelling one in that it invokes comity not
merely to encourage tolerance of multiplicity but to resolve it. The
decision in Westec goes even further than the decision in Thrifty
in two respects. First, the court was prepared to cede jurisdiction to
a foreign court and notjust to another Canadian court and, second,
the court deferred to a proceeding in which the applicant was
not seeking substantive relief but rather a negative declaration. The
court explicitly rejected arguments concerning -'unstated and unsavoury assumptions about the quality of American justice," which
it would not accept "'without cogent proof that Westec could not
get fair treatment" in the Kansas court. The court also explicitly rejected arguments that the Kansas proceedings were to be regarded
72

Wetec, supra note 4.

73 Ibid.

at 507.
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as abusive simply because they were commenced while an offer was
outstanding and because they sought only declaratory relief. The
court found the allegations regarding the deleterious effect of this
approach on the settlement process overstated, and it observed that
both of these arguments were answered by the fact that Kansas was
an appropriate forum.
Despite the fact that the Westec appeal was dismissed without
reasons by the Supreme Court of Canada,74 it would seem that certain fundamental principles are emerging from the jurisprudence,
which, when compared with other federal and regional systems,
seem likely to form the foundation for a Canadian approach to
parallel litigation. First, the common law courts in Canada seem to
be converging on a view that, rejects the traditional tolerance for
parallel litigation and that regards multiplicity as inherently at
odds with the principles of order and fairness that underlie the constitutional imperatives for the law ofjurisdiction and judgments in
Canada.75 Given such a view, multiplicity would not be just another
factor in the analysis of appropriate forum but one that could provide an independent basis for granting a stay or an injunction. To
be sure, this view would also imply a recognition of the necessity of
a rapprochement of standards between the common law provinces
and Quebec. Further, it would imply a reconsideration of some of
the dicta in the 1993 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board),V6 which suggested that the consequences of the commencement of parallel litigation "would not be disastrous '77 and should
be tolerated where both fora are appropriate.
Second, the view of inter-provincial comity that seems to be
emerging in Canada is one that calls for collegiality and cooperation among courts rather than deference in the form of noninterference. 78 It is one in which it should not matter which court
decides the issue of appropriate forum, provided that both courts
apply the same test for determining appropriate forum. Under
these circumstances, it might be possible to develop a unique
74 See the description of the appeal process in this case in the text surrounding

note 3.
7- See Morguard,supra note 1 1.
76

Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbza (Workers'Compensation Board), [1993] 1
S.C.R. 897.

77 INd
78

at 914.

See, generally, Hunt, supranote 49.
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approach to resolving situations of parallel litigation - one that
relied on the court second seized to determine whether it, or the
court first seized, was the more appropriate forum. This approach
would be in contrast to the European approach and the methods
proposed by the Committee of the ILA and the Special Commission of the Hague Conference, which required the court first seized
to make this determination. While a "second-seized" rule would
obviate the concerns about the "race to file" that were raised in the
Westec case, it would need to be couched in specific terms that
would reduce the potential for abuse. For example, deference to
the court second seized in making the determination of appropriate forum might be accompanied by requiring the plaintiff in the
second proceeding to show that he or she could not, or should not,
have to defend in the first forum. Permitting a challenge to a plaintiff's choice of forum to proceed in this way could accommodate
concerns raised by the fact that some defendants cannot travel to
request a stay from the first forum.7 9 Indeed, it might make the commencement of a second proceeding function simply as a preferable
means of dealing with those situations rather than an application
for an injunction. It would be preferable because it would operate
in a context in which the courts had acknowledged the importance
of cooperating to resolve the dispute over forum (and so would not
risk raising sensitive issues of comity), and it would involve the commencement of a proceeding that thereby demonstrated the availability of the proposed alternative forum.
Finally, further procedural requirements might need to be introduced to protect against abuse. They could include, for example,
the requirement that a plaintiff commencing a parallel proceeding
seek a determination of the issue of appropriate forum as a prerequisite to making the claim and that the plaintiff notify the first court
of the second proceeding to apprise the first court of the determination ongoing in the second court. To be sure, the mechanism
would benefit from refinement as courts became more experienced
with it. In addition, it could be improved by enhanced mechanisms
for direct communication and cooperation between courts such as
have been suggested by the Uniform Law Conference's proposed
transfer process, 0 which would, for example, permit the trial of an
issue in an alternative forum, thereby securing trial in the most
'9 Which would raise issues of access to justice that were simply the obverse of those
canvassed in Oakleyv. Barry (19 9 8), 15 8 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 679 (N.S.C.A).
so See the discussion under the heading "Transfers of Proceedings under Australian Cross-Vesting Legislation" earlier in this article.
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appropriate forum even in situations where it might vary within a
single case, for example, in respect of liability and of damages.
CHALLENGES AHEAD: ADAPTING A CANADIAN
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CASES

As noted in the introduction, Canadian courts have tended to apply
the approaches to jurisdiction and judgments that they developed
in inter-provincial cases to international cases. To what extent will
that be likely to occur in the Canadian approach to parallel proceedings? It seems likely that Canadian courts will carry over to
international cases the principle that multiplicity is not just a
factor in the analysis but also an independent basis for a judicial
response. 81 However, they are unlikely to regard it as being necessary to avoid multiplicity at all costs, for instance, forcing a local
plaintiff to resolve the matter in an inappropriate foreign forum.
Canadian courts have shown that they are prepared to consider the
issuance of an injunction as a logical corollary to the refusal of a
stay,82 but it is not clear whether this result would occur in every
case or only in cases where the court determined for other reasons
that the commencement of the foreign proceeding was an abuse.
In addition, it seems likely that Canadian courts will often be
prepared to respect a foreign court's determination of which proceeding should go forward, as they did in Westecwhen the denial of
the stay in Kansas was cited as being a reason for granting a stay in
British Columbia. In this regard, it is possible that the rule of
sequence that might develop in Canada in international parallel
litigation between common law courts will not relate to the order
in which the courts are seized but will relate instead to the order in
which they are asked to determine which is the more appropriate
forum. However, in the absence of a multilateral judgments regime
that establishes harmonized standards for jurisdiction, there will
probably always be a residual category of international cases in
which the approach of the foreign court to jurisdiction is sufficiently at odds with the Canadian approach, that it will not be suitable to forego more primitive mechanisms, such as those involving
the refusal to enforce foreign judgments, the issuance of anti-suit
injunctions, and even the tolerance of parallel proceedings. There
is hope, though, that, in time, instances of parallel litigation entailing real savagery will become relatively rare.
81 As seemed exident in Westec, supra note 4.
82 In Hudon, supra note 67.
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Summary
Parallel Proceedings - Converging Views? The Westec Appeal
The flexibility afforded by the new rules in Canadafor jurisdiction and
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